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DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM
RESTORATION ACT: THE ELIMINATION OF
COMPETITION BETWEEN DRUG
MANUFACTURERS
Jaclyn L. Miller*

INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has become a focal point in the last two
decades due to the concern over rising drug prices. Today, brand name
prescription drug prices are monitored closely by the health care
industry as well as the government. Congress recently has attempted to
pass legislation concerning the rising prices of drugs. However, the last
successful enactment of legislation that affects the prices of drugs was
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act. This
legislation was meant to address the issue of rising drug prices by
enacting various statutes meant to control the practices of brand name
manufacturers and enable generic manufacturers to participate more
actively in the market.' Throughout our recent history of trying to
make drugs more accessible to all, brand name pharmaceutical
manufacturers have become the scapegoat of the situation. They have
been portrayed as the "bad guys" who block the entry of generic

"Editor in Chief, DePaul Journal of Health Care Law. B.A., Purdue University, 1999;
J.D. (Cand.), DePaul University College of Law, 2002. This article is dedicated to Dustin
Davis whose ideas, love and support are inspirational to me, and to my parents, Alan and Dawn
Miller who have blessed my life infinitely with their love, support, and encouragement.
'Justina A. Molzon, The Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & LAW 275,
276 (1996) (discussing the steps generic drugs go through to be approved by the FDA and
highlighting the passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act).
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manufacturers into the market,
and are thus out to gouge Americans by
2
overcharging for drugs.
Drugs are a vital part of our society today. They not only increase
people's quality of life, but they save lives. These two benefits of
pharmaceutical drugs are what make high prices so hard for people to
handle. People struggle when forced to put a price on life or the quality
of one's life. While costly drugs are an enormous problem this nation
must address, blaming one side-brand name manufacturers-is not a
sound solution. Although, brand name manufacturers are the ones who
design the product and ultimately choose the price of prescription
drugs, the problem of rising drug prices is not simply a large company
out to get any company that gets in the way; it is not that cut and dry.
The problem is far more complex than the explanation the media, the
generic manufacturers and the public hears from Congress. The
solution does not come down to simply lowering the prices, or an
unwillingness to do so by brand name manufacturers. Rather, the
problem is due to a multiple of factors, which converge together and
prevent "true competition" thus lowering prices. This comment will
focus on the current view of the pharmaceutical industry, the multiple
factors involved in the drug pricing problem, and how these factors
come together to create the current problem. In the first section of the
article, the background of the pharmaceutical industry will be reviewed
and the legislation will be explained. The second part of this comment
will analyze pharmaceutical legislation and illustrate how the laws have
helped create the current problem of rising drug prices.4
BACKGROUND
Pharmaceutical Industry
Before health care was revolutionized into the present system of
managed care the pharmaceutical industry and prescription prices were
barely a concern. 5 Insurance companies did not reimburse patients for
2

Melissa K. Davis, Monopolistic Tendencies of Brand name Drug Companies in the
Pharmaceutical
Industry, 15 J.L. & CoM. 357 (1995).
3
See infra pp. 92-101.
4
See infra pp. 101-107.
5
Kevin J. Dunne & Ciara R. Ryan, How Management of Medical Costs is
Revolutionizing the DrugIndustry, 62 DEF. CouNs. J. 177 (1995).
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6
prescription drugs and did not look at the cost of prescriptions.
Physicians were also not concerned with drug prices since they were
separate entities, (i.e.-not associated with a Managed Care
Organization) and simply prescribed whatever drug they thought best
regardless of price.7 Physicians rarely turned to lower cost alternatives
because they were free to prescribe a more costly original. 8
Pharmacists were also prevented from asking patients if they preferred
to substitute the original prescribed drug, as they often do now, because
of antisubstitution laws. Therefore, before managed care the health
care industry did not focus on the cost of prescription pharmaceuticals
10
and, brand name manufacturers had a majority of the market share.
Generics were a second thought, if they were thought of at all, and
did not play a huge role in the pharmaceutical market.11 However, as
the managed care system took hold of the health care industry, prices in
every area began to be examined. 12 Managed care's goal is to provide
health care in a cheaper and more efficient manner by containing costs
at their current level or decreasing them. 13 Congress, in looking for
ways to reduce health care costs, began to focus on the pharmaceutical
industry. 14
In focusing on the pharmaceutical industry, many
legislators felt lower prices for pharmaceutical drugs could be obtained
by increasing competition between generic manufacturers and brand
name manufacturers. 15 Immediately, Congress began working with
brand name manufacturers and generic manufacturers to come up with
legislation that would protect both sides. 16 Congressional legislation
6

See Dunne, supra note 5, at 177.
David A. Balto, A Whole New World? PharmaceuticalResponses to the Managed Care
Revolution, 52 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 83, 83 (1997).
"ld. at 83.
7

9

1d.
' 0See Davis, supra note 2, at 358.

"id.
12See Dunne, supra note 5.
13Id.
4
1 Amy

Stark, Comment, The Exemption from Patent Infringement and Declaratory

Judgments: Misinterpretationof LegislativeIntent?, 31 SAN. DiNGo L. REv. 1057 (1994).
' 5Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisionsfor Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived their Usefulness? 39 J.L. & TECH. 389, 398 (1999). The process involved in passing

this legislation was quite in depth. Id. It took a couple of years for Congress to reach an
agreement with generic and brand name manufacturers. Id. After the work that was put into
the Act, it was deemed a huge success when it passed Congress. Id.

161d.
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that was suppose to provide this compromise was the Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.17
Legislative Background
One of the factors contributing to the current problem of rising drug
prices is the regulation of the pharmaceutical drug industry. The two
main areas of regulation for prescription drugs are patents and the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 18 These two areas of
regulations are closely connected and are further intertwined by the
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.19 This
section explains the relationship that patents and the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act have to the pharmaceutical industry. This
section will also explain how the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Restoration Act changed the role patents and the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act have in regards to brand name and generic
manufacturers.
Patents
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the authority to
provide inventors with patents. 20 Patents enable the inventor to exclude
21
others from using the invention while the patent is still active.
Infringement of a patent occurs when another party ignores this
exclusion and either manufactures, uses, or sells the patented invention
while the patent is active.22 Patents are meant to promote innovation by
giving innovators a safe period of time to develop their idea and bring it
to market before others can capitalize on it.23 Patents are granted under
the theory that disclosure to the public of an invention will provide a
great incentive to create other useful inventions. 24 Patents are also
17

Engelberg, supra note 15, at 398.

18Ronald L. Desrosiers, The Drug Patent Term: Longtime Battleground in the Controlof

Health Care, 24 NEw ENG. L. REv. 115 (1989).
191d.
20U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2
=Thomas F. Poche, Note, The Clinical Trial Exemption from Patent Infringement:
JudicialInterpretationof Section 271(e)(I), 74 B.U.L. REv. 903, 905 (1994) (explaining how
patents2 2reward inventors and encourages the development of additional inventions).
1d.

23Thomas T. Gordon & Arthur S. Cookfair, PATENT FUNDAMENTALS
ENGINEERS
9 (1995).
24

Id. at 9.

FOR SCIENTISTS AND
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controversial to some because they prevent competition for the life of
the patent.25 The need to protect and encourage innovation however, is
thought to outweigh the need for 26competition, making patents an
integral part of the world's economy.
The innovation and marketing of new drugs is extremely
dependent on the time provided by patents.2 7 The manufacturer's main
time in which to recoup its investment is during the time of the patent.28
Patents ensure companies that their investment into drug development
and research is wise given they provide the inventor with an exclusive
time in the market without competition in order to recoup the money
they invested while also making a profit.29 If a company does not have
a patent
on 30their product, the likelihood of the company recouping its
•
investment. Other inventors would be able to market the product on
their own, thus lowering the original inventor's market share.3" This, in
turn, lowers the amount the original manufacturer receives from selling
the product.32 If patents did not exist, there would be little invention
because the risk of investing millions of dollars only to suffer a
financial loss would be too great.33
In 1861, the life of a patent became seventeen years.34 Prior to the
twentieth century, the pharmaceutical manufacturers were able to use
the entire seventeen years to market its product.35 This is also the same
amount of time other industries receive for their investments. In 1938,
the pharmaceutical industry was changed by a new regulation that
limited the industry from profiting from the full seventeen years of

25See Stark, supra note 14, at 1060 (explaining that this right was given as a "reward...to
bring forth
new knowledge" (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1(1966)).
26
See Gordon, supra note 23.
27
John F. Niblack, Why are Drug Development Programs Growing in Size and Cost? A
View From the Industry, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 153 (1997)("Sales of a patented drug
product by the original sponsor-innovator, who incurred all of the research and development
costs for the product, can all by fifty-to-eighty percent in the first year following patent
expiration
28 . .
See Poche, supra note 21, at 908.
29
1d. at 907.
30
1d.
3rid.
32

See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 124-25.

33

Id.

318. at 118.
35
1d. at 117.
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patent life.36 This regulation, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, requires manufacturers to prove a drug is safe for humans to ingest
before the drug is approved for sale.37 While this regulation is
beneficial for the consumer, the requirements cut into the patent
period. 38 This regulation leaves brand name manufacturers with less
time to recoup their initial expenditure of a new drug. 39 This issue is
addressed by the enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Restoration Act, which provides for a patent extension. 40 However, the
issue of losing time on a patent is still a problem since most companies
are either not granted extension or not provided the full extension
allotment provided by the Act.4 '
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The Food and Drug Administration, as discussed above, plays a huge
role in regulating the pharmaceutical industry. The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act effects drug prices by requiring the
manufacturers to go through several stages to gain FDA approval for a
drug.42 Since patents are obtained before manufacturers go through this
process, the FDA regulation causes time to be lost on the patent. 43 This
translates into a direct loss of money for manufacturers. 44 Before
manufacturers even seek FDA approval, they must first go through preclinical discovery. 45 This is the process by which scientists either
discover a compound or experiment with a new one.46 Once preclinical discovery occurs, scientists test the chemical on animals as a
"possible pharmacological 'new chemical entity', [to show] that [the

36 See
37

Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 118-19.

1d. at 119.

38

See Stark, supra note 14, at 1060 (explaining how patents are obtained after the initial
discovery of the product; moreover, the patent is running during the time of development and

the time needed to obtain FDA approval).
391d. at 1057.
4
Od. at 1060
41
See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 140-143.
421 JAMES O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, §
43

See Poche, supra note 21, at 912.
44Id.
45
See O'REILLY, supranote 42, at 13-65.
46
1d.

13.11, 13-63 (2d ed. 1993).
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chemical] might intercept and combat a disease." 47 This step48prepares
the drug for human testing and lasts an average of 18 months.
The first step to gaining FDA approval begins with the
manufacturer submitting an investigational new drug (IND)
application. 49 The application is the method by which the FDA
examines the proposed human testing of the drug. 50 The next step is
Phase I of clinical testing.51 In this phase, different dosages of the drug
are given to twenty to sixty "ill patients whose disease is the target of
52 The purpose of the phase is to gain
the particular new chemical.
53
evidence of effectiveness.
In phase II, the clinical testing is performed and monitored using
"several hundred patients for the clinical effectiveness *ofthe drug.",54
These two phases take approximately two years to complete with only
one third of the drugs successfully completing these phases.5 5 Phase III
is the clinical testing of the drug.56 This phase involves thousands of
patients and determines the dosage at which the drug is the most
effective. 57 Phase HI testing lasts 1-4 years and is the most important
phase to the FDA and manufacturers since it determines the overall
effectiveness of the drug.58 Approximately one fourth of the chemicals
survive this phase of testing.6
The next stage is the new drug approval stage (NDA).6 ° It begins
with meetings between the FDA and manufacturers to discuss IND
evidence. 61 Once these meetings are conducted and suggestions of
improvement are submitted, the manufacturer prepares the NDA
application. 62 Reviews are again conducted, this time by several
47

48 See O'REILLY,

supra note 42, at 13-65.

Id.

49

1d.

-'ld.at 13-63.

51
52

1d.

See Desrosiers, supra note 18 at 120; See also O'Reilly, supra note 42, at 13-64, 13-65.
53
Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 120.
54
1d.
-SSee O'RELLY, supra note 42, at 13-65.
56

Id.

Mid.
58

1d.

59
60Id.

See O'REtLY, supra note 42, at 13-65.

61

Id.

6221

CFR §§314.102, 312.82.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 5: 91

groups, which advise the manufacturer on areas that need
improvement.63 After the reviews, the "FDA Drugs Center endorses
the recommendation" and a letter of approval is mailed.64 Before
labeling and packaging is decided, the drug is finally approved and able
to be marketed.65
The process discussed above -is approximately seven years long
and requires manufacturers to constantly working with the FDA in an
attempt to secure approval for the drug.6 When success finally comes,
manufacturers on average have spent $400-500 million and lost seven
years off their patents. 67 That leaves manufacturers still to incur the
cost of post approval testing for the FDA as well as marketing, with
Most
only 10 years in which to recoup their expenditures. 68
manufacturers contend that it takes 12-19 years to truly recoup the costs
of the drugs they make.69
Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984
(Hatch-Waxman Act) was thought to be the answer to the rising drug
prices and was deemed to be a compromise between the two competing
players in the pharmaceutical market-generic manufacturers and
brand name manufacturers. 70 The Act incorporates a benefit for each
side.7 1 The brand name manufacturers were benefited by the Act's
63

0'REILLY, supra note 42, at 13-67.

MId. at 13-69.
65

Id.

66Patent Term Extension and Pharmaceutical Innovation: Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology,
9 7 'h Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) (statement of Robert S. Walker, U.S. Representative,
Pennsylvania (citing Where the PatentLaws Don't Work, Chicago Tribune, May 1, 198 1, at 12;
Extending Patents, San Francisco Chronicle, June 17, 1981, at 13.)).
67See
Niblack, supra note 27, at 151.
68
0'RELLY, supra note 42.
69

70Desrosiers, supranote 18, at 124-25.

James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and PharmaceuticalInnovation: The Drug

Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REv. 433, 434-36

(1986 ISee Stark, supra note 14, at 1060 ("The
PTR Act was the result of a compromise
between two competing economic groups: the generic drug industry and the pioneer drug
industry. These groups each lobbied Congress for the passage of legislation to eliminate the
patent distortion most harmful to their respective industries.").
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patent restoration provision. 72
The generic manufacturers were
benefited by the Act's streamlining of the regulation approval process
and allowing immediate competition in the marketplace upon patent
expiration by allowing an exemption from infringement activities
relating to FDA submissions for generic drugs.73 The Hatch-Waxman
Act attempted to balance the public interest of faster access to cheaper
generic drugs against the research industry's financial incentive to
discover a new drug product.74
The section of the Act meant to benefit the brand name
manufacturers was patent restoration. 75 The patent restoration section
was meant to enable brand name manufacturers with a means to make
up for lost time on their patents due to the regulatory process of getting
FDA approval.76 The time allotment that a patent gives the brand name
drug begins running long before the FDA approves a drug for the
market.77 Actually, approximately seven years are lost off the patent
due to the regulatory process of the FDA.78 "Innovators state that they
need approximately twelve to nineteen years to gain back the cost of
research and development of the drug. ' 79 The patent extension section
of the Hatch-Waxman Act was designed to put this time back on the
patent for the manufacturers, because many were having a hard time
recouping the money they expended in making the drug. 80 The8 patent
extension section was thought to be the solution to this problem. '
The term of a patent eligible for extension "shall be extended by
the time equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product,
which period occurs after the date the patent is issued., 8 2 Except that
72

Wheaton, supra note 70, at 435.
Ned Milenkovish, Deleting the Bolar Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act:
Harmonizing PharmaceuticalPatent Protection in a Global Village, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
751,755 (1999).
74
Engelberg, supra note 15, at 389.
7535 U.S.c.S. § 156 (2000).
76
Poche, supra note 21, at 914.
77
1d. at 913.
7
73

8

1d.

79

Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 124-25.
8Old.
8
1See Stark, supra note 14, at 1060. Generic and brand name manufacturers came to a
compromise and the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed. Id. This was believed to be the answer
to previous problems faced by both sides. Id.
1235 U.S.C.S. § 156(c) (2000).
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"each period of regulatory review shall be reduced by any period
determined, which the applicant for the patent extension did not act
with due diligence during such period of the regulatory review
period. ' 8 3 The difficulty with this provision of the Act is that patent
extensions are rarely given. a4 Patents are hardly ever extended and if
patents are extended, the manufacturers are not provided with the total
amount of extension time allowed for by the Act.8 1 In 1998, the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) received ninety applications that were
based on human drug products; out of the extensions granted, only two
were given the entire period of extension. 86
Patent extensions were refused for various reasons.8 7 Some
refusals were based on the PTO's interpretation of the statute's
legislative history that implied that Congress only wanted extensions
given to those drugs that had FDA approval for the first time. 8 Other
refusals were based on the fact that the drug's commercial marketing or
use was not the initial use or marketing of the product.8 9 It is clear that
brand name manufacturers still suffer from the problem of having their
patent run out before the manufacturer can recoup its expenditures,
since brand name manufacturers are not given the full.benefit of the
patent extensions that they were supposed to be provided through the
Hatch-Waxman Act. 90 This process has forced many companies out of
the research and development part of the pharmaceutical field. 9 '
The other sections of the Hatch-Waxman Act are meant to benefit
generic manufacturers by facilitating competition between generic and
brand name manufacturers. 92 One section assists in facilitating
competition by eliminating requirements of the FDA approval process
for generic drugs. 93 The amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and

8335 U.S.C.S. § 156(c)(1) (2000).
84

Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 140-43.

85

1d.

861d.
87
1d.
88
d.
89

Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 140-43.

90

91

d. at 141-43.

1d.
92
Molzon, supra note 1, at 276.
93
Id.
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94
Cosmetic Act is the Abbreviated New Drug Applications (ANDA).
ANDA provides that so long as the active ingredient in a generic drug
is the same as a previously approved drug, the shortened approval
process can be followed. 95 This process allows generics to gain
approval without having to duplicate costly research and submit test
data to the FDA for purposes of drug approval. 96 Generic drugs only
have to show that the route of administration, dosage form, and strength
of the new drug are the same as an already approved brand name drug;
the new drug is bioequivalent to the brand name drug, and the labeling
proposed for the new
drug is the same as the labeling approved for the
97
drug.
name
brand
The second section of the Hatch-Waxman Act that benefits
generic manufacturers is the clinical trial exemption found in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1). 98 This allows exclusion from the scope of the patent, thus
exempting the generic manufacturers from patent infringement when
using the brand name product before the patent runs out to conduct
their own research for their drug. 99 This exemption allows generic drug
manufacturers to use the inventor's drug product before the patent
expires, allowing them to create the generic drug for dramatically less
money.100 In addition to the generic manufacturers benefiting from the
reduction in cost, generic manufacturers also benefit from judicial
interpretation, which interprets the provision extremely broadly. 1° 1 The
legislative history of the act suggests that Congress did not intend for
this broad interpretation, however, Congress failed to state this directly
and thus courts are broadly construing the statute. 10 2 Courts are basing
94

Abbreviated New Drug Applications Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, §101, 98 Stat. 1585

(1996).
96Molzon, supra note 1, at 276 ("It was recognized that the safety and effectiveness of
the drug had been amply demonstrated by adequate and well controlled studies by the pioneer
drug manufacturer, by the acceptance of these findings by the medical community, and by the
widespread use of these drug entities in patient therapy over many years.").
S7§101,
98 Stat. 1585.
9535 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1995).
99

1d.

'05 Molzon, supranote 1, at 277-78.
'l0 Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Can the Safe Harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Shelter
PioneerDrugManufacturers?,53 FoOD DRUG L. J. 643, 643 (1998). Legislative history of this
act shows that the statute was supposed to be much narrower. Id. However, the language of
the statute
is quite broad, and the judicial system has increased this broadness. Id.
10 2Id.
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the broad interpretation of the statute on the wording "reasonably
related to the development". 10 3 Hence, while courts are perfectly
within their bounds to make such liberal interpretations of this
phrase,
04
this interpretation severely hurts brand name manufacturers. 1
These two provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act enable generic
manufacturers to produce their product at a highly reduced cost
compared to the brand name manufacturers.10 5
While the lower
costing generic drug translates into less expenditure for HIOs and the
public, the thought that these lower costing drugs will increase
competition and lower brand name drug prices has backfired."' The
reason prices are not lowering for brand name drugs stems from the
Hatch-Waxman Act and its interaction with patents and the FDA. The
following section will analyze the legislation and explain why the
legislation and the government's view of the industry are flawed.
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT MODEL
The current view of the pharmaceutical industry focuses on the concept
of competition between generic and brand name manufacturers.1 0 7 In
most areas the idea of increased competition creating lower prices is a
sound conclusion in the economic world.
However, in the
pharmaceutical industry, this has not materialized-prices are still
rising.10 8 The different legislation discussed above might create
competition that results in two sides against each other, but it does not
create "true competition" that results in lowered prices. It is obvious
the government and public want true competition but unfortunately, the
legislation as is, will never achieve this goal.
There are two reasons why the current view and legislation is
flawed and thus fails to create true competition. First, the provisions of
103Brinckerhoff, supra note 101 at 643.

104Id.

10535 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1); §101, 98 Stat. 1585.

106See Desrosiers, supranote 18, at 143.
107See Stark, supra note 14, at 1057. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984 was a measure used to create more competition between generic and
brand name manufacturers. Id. From the point of the Act being passed, Congress and the
public have held the belief that the problem with drug prices rising is a lack of competition
between the two sides. Id.
108See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 143.
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the Hatch-Waxman Act cause unequal benefits between generic and
brand name manufacturers. Second, these unequal benefits result in
brand name manufacturers having to raise prices not lower them.
Unequal Benefits Between Generic and Brand Name
Manufacturers
True competition does not exist between brand name and generic
manufacturers because of unequal benefits that the Hatch-Waxman Act
bestows on the two sides. 10 9 These benefits create an unequal playing
This section will explain the
field that inhibits true competition. 110
and brand name
manufacturing
generic
differences between
manufacturing of drugs by the Hatch-Waxman Act, and will discuss
how these differences are the flaws that prohibit true competition from
occurring.
Development andResearch Costs
The first difference between brand name and generic drug
manufacturing that creates an uneven playing field is the fact that brand
name manufacturers have a much higher cost of research and
Brand name
development than generic manufacturers." 1
manufacturers spend from $400-500 million on the drugs that survive
the approval process and are marketed for consumers.' 12 However,
there are still far more drugs that brand name manufacturers pour
1 13
money into which never make it through the FDA approval process.
Drug manufacturers have stated that "every year scientists screen more
than 126,000 chemicals for potential drug development. Of that
number, they will actually follow up on about 1,000. Of that number
only sixteen will ever make it through the regulatory process and
eventually appear in the pharmacy. Only one tenth of one percent of all
chemicals entering the process will finally be approved."' 1 4 This
means manufacturers spend millions of dollars on research and
development on compounds that most likely will never make a profit
' 09See 35 U.S.C. §271(e)(1); §101, 98 Stat. 1585; 35 U.S.C.A. §156.

"1d.

"'See Niblack, supra note 27; Desrosiers, surpa note 18,
" 2 See Niblack, supranote 27, at 151.
113

See Patent Term Extension, supra note 66.

14Id.
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for them. Hence, the drugs that do make it to the pharmacy must
reimburse not only the money spent to get it to market, but also the
money spent on researching the other possibilities that failed. Generic
manufacturers do not face this issue. Instead generics are duplicated
from brand name drugs.115 They do not incur the cost of developing
new chemicals, and thus do not have to incorporate the cost of into the
price of their product. Generic manufacturers must simply come up
with a bioequivalent to the brand name drug. 1 6 While this takes some
time and research, it pales in comparison to the time, research, and
expense brand name manufacturers face.
Cost ofApproval
In addition to the difference in development and research of drugs,
there is a difference in the regulatory approval process between brand
name and generic manufacturers. The FDA process for brand name
drugs is longer, costlier, and more in depth than the FDA process
generic drugs must go through. 1 7 In the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress
made the process easier for generic drugs by creating the Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA). 118 This process only requires generic
manufacturers to prove their drug is bioequivalent to a brand name
drug, and that the "active ingredient, dosage form, strength, and route
of administration" of the drug are the same as an already approved
brand name drug." 19 Finally, the generic manufacturers must show that
the labeling proposed is the same as the labeling approved for the brand
name drug.12 0 This process may bring drugs, which are cheaper onto
the market, but granting this benefit to generic manufacturers does not
create true competition. It instead pits brand name manufacturers
against a side that is given greater cost and time reduction benefits than
"5 See Molzon, supra note 1, at 275. See also Poche, supra note 21, at 913. Generic
drugs are able to "complete the FDA testing process 'during the active patent term' without
infringing the patent." Id. Generic drug manufacturers use the active ingredients from the
brand name drugs to create their drug. They only alter the inactive ingredients. Id.
"6§ 101, 98 Stat. 1585.
" 7 See 21 CFR §314; §101, 98 Stat 1585.
"18See Poche, supra note 21, at 913.
" 9 See Molzon, supra note 1, at 277 (explaining generic manufacturers must also follow
the FDA guidelines imposed on brand name manufacturers in regards to the "identity, strength,
quality and purity" of the drug).
20§101, 98 Stat. 1585.
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brand name manufacturers. Brand name manufacturers cannot compete
with this advantage. Brand name drugs still must go through the same
costly process to gain approval, and brand name manufacturers'
production costs are not decreasing. 12 1 Brand name manufacturers
cannot logically make a drug cheaper than the generic manufacturers or
even just a cheaper drug when generic manufacturers are given such an
advantage.
Patent Issues
In addition to the difference caused by the shortened FDA approval
process for generic drugs, generic manufacturers are also benefited by
the clinical trial exemption granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act.' 22 This
allows generic manufacturers to use the brand name product before the
123
patent has run out to conduct research on the generic drug.
Normally, if a company or person used a product in researching their
1 24
own product, they would be found guilty of patent infringement.
However, this provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides protection
for generic manufacturers to use these products and not be found guilty
of infringing the patent. 125 In providing this protection and allowing
generic manufacturers to use brand name drugs in their research, the
Act provides a huge monetary benefit.' 26 This benefit arises because
generic manufacturers can now produce their drug faster and they have
less research to do.

'21See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 119-22 ("Drug innovators explain the rise in drug
prices with a variety of factors. Foremost is the rapid escalation in research and development
costs. In 1962, the approximate cost to develop and bring one new drug to the point of
marketing was $6.5 million. In 1976, the cost jumped to about $54 million." Id. at 126-27.
The cost in 1989 was estimated at $94 million. Id.).
"22See Stark, supra note 14, 1061 (The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the "Patent Code to
include section 271(e)(1), which provide[d] that 'it shall not be an act of patent infringement to
make, use, or sell a patented invention.. .solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs."'). Id.
1"3 See Poche, supra note 21, 914. Generic manufacturers are able to use the brand name
drug while developing the bioequivalent generic drug before the patent runs out. Id. This used
to be considered an infringement of the patent, but the Hatch-Waxman Act now provides the
generic manufacturers with this benefit. Id.
124See Stark, supra note 14, at 1061-62.

'25Id.
26

1 See Desrosiers, supra note 18; Molzon, supra note 1.
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No other field that involves invention provides competing
inventors with such an advantage. The patent system is supposed to
protect the patentee and this protection is supposed to increase
128
invention. 127 The pharmaceutical industry is completely opposite.
While protection and patents are still given to the person who invents a
drug or chemical first, the industry gives startling assistance to
companies trying to copy the invention. 129 The reason these types of
provisions are not seen in other areas of innovation is because they are
adverse to the purpose of patents-protection and incentive to
invent. 130 There is a smaller incentive to invent new drugs because
brand name manufacturers are not given the same protection that
patents are supposed to give. The Hatch-Waxman Act took this away
in an effort to spur competition, yet it greatly deters research and
development.
While the Hatch-Waxman Act gave generic manufacturers the
benefit of a shorter approval process and a clinical trial exemption,
brand name manufacturers were given a patent restoration.13 1 This was
supposed to make up for the time that brand name manufacturers lost
on their patents due to the FDA regulations. 132 Unfortunately, patent
restoration does not provide the benefit it was supposed to give. The
purpose behind the provision of the Act was to give back to the brand
133
name manufacturers the length of time of the regulatory review.
However when the provision was passed it contained four ways in
which the final extension time could be limited. 134 First, time can be
taken away if the applicant, during the regulatory process, does not act
with due diligence. 3 5 Second, the regulatory review period can only
include one half of the investigational period.13 6 Third, the patent term,
plus the patent extension, can not exceed fourteen years. Finally, only
one patent may be extended for the same regulatory review period,
127
See Poche, supra note 21, at 906.
128See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 124.
129

Id.

13See Poche, supra note 21, at 906.
31
' See, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1); §101, 98 STAT. 1585; 35 U.S.C.A.
132See Stark, supra note 14, at 1060.
133 Id.

134See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 140.
1351d.

1361d.

§ 156.
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even though one drug involves more than one patent. 137 These factors
create a situation in which applications for patent extension are either
138
denied or not given the full allotted amount provided by the statute.
In February 29, 1988, forty extensions were granted for human drug
products. 39 Out of these forty, the regulatory review period had
averaged 8.2 years, yet the extension granted for these forty averaged
1.8 years.
From these statistics it is obvious that the relief or benefit
the Hatch-Waxman Act promised has not materialized. Brand name
manufacturers are still losing enormous time due to regulatory review
by the FDA. In addition to this failure to provide brand name
manufacturers with patent extensions, judicial review of 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) hurts brand name manufacturers and provides generic
manufacturers with a benefit that Congress never imaged.141
CurrentLegislation Results in Brand Name Manufacturers
Raising Prices and Moving into Other Areas
In comparing the two sides of the pharmaceutical industry and the
benefits given by the Hatch-Waxman act, it is clear that the benefits are
firmly on the side of the generic manufacturer. This provides the
public with a wealth of generic drugs at far cheaper prices than their
brand name counterparts, but the situation is never going to cause brand
name drug prices to go down. Brand name manufacturers are in a
situation in which the manufacturers can not, on their own, reduce costs
of manufacturing and development. Actually prices are rising for brand
name manufacturers in these areas.1 42 The brand name manufacturers
are prodded by the government to compete with generic manufacturers,
yet the generic manufacturers are given the advantage of a shorter
approval process and the use of brand name products to conduct
research. These advantages cause the two sides to be unbalanced. This
lack of balance between brand name and generic manufacturers results
in an uneven playing field; a field that prevents "true competition" from
occurring. As a result of the pressure from the government to lower
37

See Desrosiers, supra note 18, at 140.

13Sld at 141-43.
13 9Id.
1401d.
4
1'
See Brinckerhoff, supra note 101, at 643.
142See Niblack, supra note 27, at 151.
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prices, with no assistance to enable the companies to do so, many brand
name manufacturers are leaving the drug innovation area. Those
companies who have not left have either added generic manufacturing
or formularies to what they do. These actions by the brand name
manufacturers have been viewed by many as a manner to further
monopolize the industry. Yet, the truth of the matter is these actions
are done as a way of survival.
Solution
The solution to the problem of rising drug prices can only be found in
realizing that brand name and generic manufacturers must be in true
competition for prices to go down. To create true competition, the
playing field must be equal between the two sides. This field can be
equalized by giving brand name manufacturers the full benefit of the
patent extensions, as provided by the Hatch-Waxman Act. 143 By
allowing the extensions the Act was supposed to afford the brand name
manufacturers, the manufacturers will now be able to recoup more of
their initial expense of development and approval, and thus can pass
this savings on to the customers. Congress may have to change the
provision to make this possible since the PTO is currently interpreting
the provision so narrowly. 144 In addition to providing brand name
manufacturers with the necessary patent extensions, the playing field
could also be made more equal by having Congress amend 35 U.S.C.145
§
meaning.
narrow
a
was
that
intent
original
their
reflect
to
(e)(1)
271
This would curtail the judicial interpretation that is currently
continuously expanding the statute's provision, and thus protecting
generic manufacturers from being found guilty of patent
infringement. 146
This amendment would allow brand name
manufacturers to be in an equalized position since they would retain
more of the protection their patents are supposed to provide.
These changes give the pharmaceutical companies more equality
against the benefits provided the generic manufacturers by the HatchWaxman Act. These changes would also enable the brand name
manufacturers to provide some relief in regards to rising drug prices.
However, this solution can not and will not lower their prices to the
141§101,

144

98 STAT. 1585.

See Brinckerhoff, supra note 101, at 643.

145See Brinckerhoff, supra note 101.
146

Id.
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level of generic drugs, since there is no way to eliminate the difference
between generic and brand name manufacturers when it comes to
approval costs and developmental and research costs. Even if it was
possible to dispose of some of the red tape and paper work that brand
name manufacturers must go through to get FDA approval, brand name
manufacturer will still have more costs involved than generic
manufacturers.
Also, it is not possible to eliminate the fact that
manufacturers' outlays are rising and this cost will be carried over into
the cost of drugs seen by the public.
Hence, while the solution of providing the patent extensions to
brand name manufacturers and limiting the judicial broadening of 35
U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) should provide some relief to brand name
manufacturers in regards to cost, this cost reduction should be seen in
drug prices. While this is not an overall solution to the problem of
rising drug prices, it is a positive step in the right direction.
CONCLUSION
Prices for brand name pharmaceuticals will not go down under the
Brand name
method that the government is currently using.
manufacturers can not compete with generic manufacturers to produce
lower costing drugs because of the deferential in the initial cost outlay
to produce a new drug compared to a generic drug. In addition, current
legislation hinders brand name manufacturers while benefiting generic
manufacturers. The hindrance placed on brand name manufacturers, in
fact, causes them to raise their prices in an effort to stay in research and
development.
If America wants new innovative drugs to treat the sick and cure
the dying, the current system must change. The government must stop
believing that the brand name manufacturers are out to gouge the
American people of their money. They must look at the true reasons
that drug prices are high. Costs of producing these drugs are constantly
escalating. While FDA approval is necessary, it is inefficient and
costly. Laws enable generics to enter the market before brand name
manufacturers can get their initial costs reimbursed. These factors are
what make up the present problem of drug prices. The current problem
is not coming from one source; it is caused by many dependent factors,
which makes a solution harder to find. However, a solution must be
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found that does not discourage brand name manufacturers. One worse
fate than high priced pharmaceuticals is no new pharmaceuticals-and
this is a very real threat.

